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exception would seem to hinder employment of federal savings bonds
with their survivorship provisions as "a convenient method of avoiding
complicated probate proceedings." 16
Community Property Agreement-Private Pension Fundc-Designated Beneficiary Other Than Surviving Spouse. The conflict in the
Washington Supreme Court as to priority between contract law and
community property law, which resulted in a 5-4 decision in Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. Powers,' is still present after 27 years. The contract at
issue in the principal case was the General Electric Pension Trust, to
which decedent had contributed premiums for 13. years. During that
time decedent had been married three times and divorced twice. Neither divorce decree had disposed of the pension funds, and decedent's
second wife was the designated beneficiary at his death. During his
third marriage, decedent and his third wife, the plaintiff, entered into
a statutory community property agreement? which provided that the
separate property of each was converted into community property and
the survivor would hold title to all community property upon the death
of either party.
Upon the husband's death, the Pension Board paid into court a lump
sum in the amount of decedent's contributions, plus accrued interest,
and sought judicial determination of the proper recipient under the
Declaratory Judgments Act.' Decedent's three former wives stipulated
that the first two wives were entitled to one-half of the funds contributed during the period of their respective marriages,' and that plaintiff
was entitled to all of the funds contributed during the period of her
marriage. The only contested fund was the former separate property
16 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 669 (1962). "The success of the management of the
national debt was deemed to depend upon the successful sale of the savings bonds, one
of the inducements to purchasers being survivorship provisions." Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,
376 U.S. 306, 307 (1964).
S192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937).
§ 26.16.120 (1958) : "Agreements as to status. Nothing contained in any of the provisions of this chapter or in any law of this state, shall prevent
the husband and wife from jointly entering into any agreement concerning the- status or
disposition of the whole or any portion of the community property then owned by them
or afterwards to be acquired, to take effect upon the death of either...." See Brachtenbach, Community PropertyAgreements-Many Questions, Few Answers, 37 WASH. L.
REv. 469 (1962) ; Comment, 77w Community Property Agreement Statute, 25 WAsH.
L. REV. 165 (1950).
8 WASH. REv. CODE ch. 724 (1956).
4 Failure of a divorce decree to dispose of community property results in the former
spouses holding thereafter as tenants in common. Ambrose v. Moore, 46 Wash. 463, 90
Pac. 588 (1907). The stipulation in the principal case merely effected partition of the
tenancy, and payment of her one-half to each former wife.
2 WASH. REV. CODE
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of decedent, i.e., those funds contributed while decedent was single and
one-half of his contributions during his first two marriages. While plaintiff's claim was predicated upon the community property terms of the
agreement relating to the property belonging to plaintiff and decedent,
the second wife claimed the pension funds as the designated beneficiary.
Judgment granted plaintiff was affirmed on appeal. Held: Effectuation
of the policy goals of the statutory community property agreement requires that such an agreement, disposing of community property which
had been the spouse's separate property in an industrial pension plan
fund, extinguish the existing contractual rights of a former wife as prior
designated beneficiary of the fund, despite noncompliance with the
pension plan's provisions for change of beneficiary. Neeley v. Lockton,
63 Wn.2d 929,389 P.2d 909 (1964).
The pension plan provided for changes of beneficiary as follows:
An employee, before or after his retirement, may from time to time change
the beneficiary designated by him. . . ,without the consent of any such
beneficiary, by filing written notice thereof with the Pension Board in a
manner prescribed by the rules of the Pension Board as from time to
time in effect ....
The court characterized the pension fund as a contract, with the designated beneficiary possessing the rights of a third party beneficiary
which, though vested, were subject to divestment by change of beneficiary. The court impliedly treated the Pension Board rules as the exclusive method for such change.
Further, the court accepted plaintiff's contention that the community
property agreement executed by decedent and plaintiff had the dual
effect of converting the separate property of each spouse into community property and providing that the surviving spouse take all. Consequently, the court found a direct conflict between the contractual rights
of the second wife as the designated beneficiary of the pension fund and
the property rights of plaintiff as defined by the community property
agreement.
The majority's6 finding of a conflict between contract and community
property law seems forced, for the pension plan's provisions for change
of beneficiary need not have been construed as the exclusive method
563

Wn.2d at 930, 389 P.2d at 910.

6 The court split three ways. A majority of five subscribed to the Occidental Life
analogy. One judge concurred in the result, but would have overruled Occidental Life
and succeeding cases. Three judges dissented, subscribing to the Occidental Life decisions but declining to extend their rationale to the principal case.
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for such change. These provisions were general, as contrasted with the
specificity required in insurance contracts. By liberal construction,
even the "tight" language of insurance provisions for change of beneficiary has been avoided by the court in prior decisions.1
Community property rights were not involved in the only prior
Washington decision dealing with a private industrial pension plan.'
In both the earlier case and the principal case, however, the court
sought guidance in life insurance law. In the principal case the court
was guided by the line of cases9 which began with Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. Powers. These cases had established priority of the spouse's
rights to that portion of the life insurance proceeds allocable to premiums paid from community funds over those of the designated beneficiary. The decision in the principal case to extend community property rights, acquired by means of a community property agreement, to
funds originally allocable only to decedent's separate property was
clearly a policy choice by the court. The court stated that its decision
would give "reasonable legal amplitude, scope and effect to the community property device," and give effect to "the reasonable expectations of the parties entering such an agreement"--a choice between "a
vital element of the structure of community property law"'0 and "far
lesser interests."'
The court's adoption of the life insurance analogy should have resulted in the opposite conclusion to that reached by the court. The contrary result was only avoided because the insurance law adopted by the
Washington court in Occidental Life is contrary to the position of most
states regarding the effect of a divorce decree on designation of a former spouse as beneficiary." Occidental Life failed to distinguish between the rights of ownership of a policy and rights of a beneficiary to
the proceeds of a policy. Rights of ownership, including borrowing
against the policy, assignment, and change of beneficiary if allowed, are
7See, e.g., Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Sutter, 1 Wn2d 285, 95 P.2d 1014 (1939), and
cases
8 cited therein.
Richardson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 11 Wn2d 288, 118 P.2d 985 (1941), not
cited by the court in the principal case. The plan there before the court was characterized as a "contractual obligation ... analogous to a situation where ... beneficiary is entitled to recover upon a personal insurance policy... ." Id. at 320, 118 P.2d at 999.
9
E.g., In re Leuthold's Estate, 52 Wn.2d 299, 324 P2d 1103 (1958) ; Northwestern
Life Ins. Co. v. Perrigo, 47 Wn2d 291, 287 P.2d 334 (1955) ; United Benefit Ins. Co. v.
Price, 46 Wn2d 587, 283 P.2d 119 (1955). See Cross, The Community Property Law
inWashington, 15 LA. L. REv. 640, 646-47 (1955).
10 63 Wn.2d at 934, 389 P2d at 912.
11Id. at 935, 389 P.2d at 913.
22 See 31 WAsH. L. REv. 146 (1955).
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present and vested. On the other hand, a beneficiary has no such
rights; his rights are limited to the policy proceeds, and do not vest
until death of the insured. By this analysis, decedent had only the
rights of ownership to the pension fund, and did not possess the rights
of his beneficiary to the proceeds. Hence he could not transfer his
beneficiary's rights to the marital community when he executed the
community property agreement with plaintiff. However, nullification
of the beneficiary's rights would still result if Washington's community
property law requires that the rights of the beneficiary be dependent
upon either the separate character of the property source or concurrent
designation as beneficiary by both spouses.
The appropriateness of the analogy between life insurance and the
General Electric Pension Trust is subject to question. No direct relationship exists between life insurance premiums and proceeds; the
beneficiary is entitled to proceeds in the face amount of the policy
regardless of the amount of premiums paid by the insured. The proceeds of the Pension Trust, however, are directly related to, and determined by, the amount of the employee's contributions. While the distinction between rights of ownership and beneficiary rights has this
conceptual support in insurance law, the conceptual distinction did not
exist under the terms of the Pension Trust."
Although the Occidental Life doctrine may be justified by considerations of community property policy, extension of its rationale to pension plans only exaggerates Washington's deviation from the position
of most other community property states. Such an extension is also unfortunate in that pension plans are a rapidly expanding innovation;'
it seems likely that litigation of pension rights will increase in the future, and the unwarranted-even if convenient-analogy to insurance
law may limit relief sought, and afforded, to that traditionally available
in insurance cases.
Torts-Liability of Community for Tortious Act of Public Officer.
Washington marital communities have been immune since 1890 from
liability for tortious acts committed by a public officer in performance
1 California has expressly rejected the application of insurance concepts to public
pension plans. Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr.
257 (1963). Two courts have adopted the insurance analogy, without discussion or
citation of authority, in litigation involving private pension plans under community
property systems. Boyd v. Curran, 166 F. Supp. 193 (S.D. N.Y. 1958) (California);
Succession of Rockvoan, 141 So.2d 438 (La. 1962).
14See Goldworn, Pension Plans: Their Background, Current Trends, and an
Agenda for Industry, 25 OHio ST. L.J. 234 (1964).

